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’Til Death Do Us Part:
The Difficulties of Obtaining a Same-Sex Divorce
Ellen Shapiro*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores a problem faced by many wedded same-sex couples: the
difficulty in obtaining a divorce. Suppose two men from Pennsylvania travel to
Massachusetts to obtain a marriage license and return to Pennsylvania shortly
thereafter. If their marriage breaks down, the couple will be unable to divorce in the state
because Pennsylvania refuses to recognize the marriage for any purpose. Moreover, due
to Massachusetts’ residency requirement, the couple cannot simply travel back to
Massachusetts to divorce. Because this problem is in part encouraged by state miniDOMAs, and the Supreme Court has the opportunity to rule on DOMA’s
constitutionality, this Article will also explore the various rationales for holding DOMA
unconstitutional, how each affects mini-DOMAs, and thus same-sex divorce. If miniDOMAs are permitted to stand, this Article urges that all States be required to recognize
same-sex marriage at least for the limited purpose of granting divorce so that married
same-sex couples will no longer find themselves “wedlocked.”
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INTRODUCTION
It is unclear whether Jessica Port and Virginia Anne Cowan should be referred to
as a lucky couple. They lived in Maryland, which did not recognize same-sex marriage.
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Nevertheless, in October 2008, they married out-of-state.1 Unfortunately, their undying
love for each other did not last. The women separated in June of 2009, and,in July of
2010, they filed for divorce in Maryland.2 However, this did not end their story.
Following a seven-minute hearing,3 Judge A. Michael Chapdelaine denied the couple’s
request for an uncontested divorce. He cited the fact that the state of Maryland did not
recognize the women’s marriage even though he acknowledged the parties demonstrated
an “express purpose of ending their marriage and there [was] no hope or expectation of
reconciliation.”4 Judge Chapdelaine further remarked that to recognize the marriage, even
solely for the purpose of granting the divorce, would be contrary to public policy.5 What
made this case odd was that Maryland had previously recognized other marriages that
were not allowed in Maryland for purposes of divorce.6 Moreover, at the time Judge
Chapdelaine denied the couple’s divorce, other courts in Maryland were willing to grant
same-sex divorces.7
This Maryland district court, however, left Port wondering if she would ever get
divorced.8 She feared that she would be tied to Cowan forever, and without a divorce,
Port worried she would not be able to move forward.9 Port was also concerned about the
consequences of purchasing assets and eventually having children: would Cowan have
any property interest in the house Port recently purchased if the couple was technically
still married? If Port had a child, would Cowan be presumed to have joint-custody?10
Fortunately, by 2012, Port’s fears were subdued when the highest court in Maryland
finally granted the couple a divorce, finding it unconstitutional to leave same-sex married
couples without a remedy to dissolve a marriage.11
Future same-sex couples facing divorce in Maryland will not face the same
trauma that Port and Cowan had to endure because the state legislature recently passed a
bill that legalizes same-sex marriage.12 Still, the majority of states do not recognize samesex marriage, and the inability of married same-sex couples to divorce is bound to be a
*Harvard Law School, J.D. Candidate 2013; Duke University, B.A. 2010. Special thanks to Professor
Michael Klarman for insightful comments on an earlier version of this article.
1
Port v. Cowan, Case No. CAD10-22420 at *1 (Cir. Ct. Md. Oct. 22, 2010). Thanks to the National Center
for Lesbian Rights for providing a copy of the case.
2
Id.
3
Md. High Court to Hear Same-Sex Divorce Case,CBS NEWS(April 6, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57410423/md-high-court-to-hear-same-sex-divorce-case/.
4
Port, Case No.CAD10-22420 at *1.
5
Id. at *1–2.
6
Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98 A. 358, 359 (1916) (recognizing a union between an uncle and a
niece for purpose of divorce only).
7
See, e.g.,Cole v. Clover,No. 18-C-10-000327 (Cir. Ct. St. Mary’s Cnty., Md. 2010).
8
Andrea F. Siegel, Same-Sex Divorce Case Heads to Top Maryland Court, THE BALTIMORE SUN, March
17, 2012 available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-03-17/news/bs-md-ar-same-sex-divorce20120317_1_gay-divorce-divorce-hearing-uncontested-divorce/2.
9
See Elizabeth Landau, Denied Divorce, Some Same-Sex Couples ‘Wed-locked’, CNN (June 7, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/07/living/same-sex-divorce/index.html.
10
Seeid.
11
Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 982 (2012) (“Under the principles of the doctrine of comity . . . Maryland
courts will withhold recognition of a valid foreign marriage only if that marriage is “repugnant” to State
public policy. . . . A valid out-of-state same-sex marriage should be treated by Maryland courts as worthy
of divorce . . . ”).
12
Civil Marriage Protection Act, 2012 Maryland Laws Ch. 2 (H.B. 438) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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problem until same-sex marriage is nationally recognized (and not just for purposes of
receiving federal benefits) or until courts realize their ability (or requirement, if Congress
steps in) to grant same-sex divorces. Under the current framework, as more same-sex
couples get married, more same-sex couples will desire divorces and yetbe forced to
remain in their failed marriages.13 Courts in Nebraska, Indiana, Texas, and
Pennsylvania—states that do not recognize same-sex marriage—have each denied samesex divorces.14 The problem arises because, for the most part, states that do not recognize
same-sex marriage are refusing to grant couples thathave been married elsewhere
divorces.15 To make matters worse, many couples are also being denied access to courts
for the purpose of being divorced in the state where the original marriage was performed
due to standard residency requirements. For example, a same-sex couple from
Philadelphia married in Massachusetts would likely be denied a divorce if they returned
to Pennsylvania, which does not recognize same-sex marriage.16 Additionally, on account
of Massachusetts’ residency requirement for divorce—that at least one spouse live in
Massachusetts for a year prior to filing for divorce—the couple would be left without a
venue to perform a divorce.17 To complicate mattersfurther, Massachusetts’ statute not
only requires one year of residency, but the state also will not grant a divorce to a couple
that “removed into this commonwealth for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.”18
In many respects, same-sex marriage has given the words “’til death do us part” a
whole new meaning. While no one enters a marriage wishing that it will end prematurely,
nearly 50% of all marriages end in divorce.19There is no reason to believe the divorce rate
for same-sex couples will be drastically different from that of heterosexual couples.
Although divorce can have negative effects on the individuals involved as well as
children,20 the ramifications for same-sex couples who are unable to divorce are
catastrophic. But neither Congress nor the circuit courts have adequately addressed this
problem. Congress needs to amend the law to explicitly require courts to hear same-sex
divorce cases. Alternatively, courts should adjust their understanding of the law to open
13

See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ranzy, No. 49D12-0903-DR-014654 (Ind. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2009) (denying
divorce to same-sex couple); Mueller v. Pry, No. CI10-237 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Jan. 25, 2011) (same); Kern v.
Taney, No. 09-10738 (Pa. Berks County Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 15, 2010) (same); In re Marriage of J.B. &
H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010) (same).
14
Id.
15
A few courts in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage continue to open their courtrooms for the
purpose of performing same-sex divorces. See, e.g.,Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 157 (Wyo.
2011); Port, 44 A.3d at 982.
16
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1 (2012).
17
See MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 208 § 5 (2012).
18
Id.
19
See, e.g., Stephen J. Bahr, Social Science Research on Family Dissolution: What it Shows and How it
Might be of Interest to Family Law Reformers, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 5 (2002).
20
See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 653 (2d Ed. 2007) (referring to the uneven socioeconomic consequences of divorce); L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION xii (1985) (noting that
divorced women and children experience a 73% decline in standard of living post-divorce); JUDITH
S.WALLERSTEIN, JULIA M. LEWIS &SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE xiv
(2000) (arguing that children often have negative effects from taking on new responsibilities after their
parents are divorced); Paul R. Amato, The Consequences of Divorce for Adults and Children,62 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1269, 1269 (2000); Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce:
A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1169 (1999) (describing the hardships women and
children experience after divorce).
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their doors to grant same-sex divorces.Regardless of whether astate acknowledges samesex marriages for other purposes, its courts should grant these divorces so that same-sex
couples will no longer be “wedlocked”21 in failed marriages.
This Article argues that same-sex couples have the same right to divorce as
heterosexual couples. Denying same-sex divorces creates a serious burden on same-sex
couples, violates their right to divorce, and amounts to a denial of these couples’ due
process rights. Because the issue of same-sex divorce is intimately related to recognition
of same-sex marriage, this Article will first explore in depth the Defense of Marriage Act,
the federal law that (a) defines marriage as exclusively between one man and one woman,
and (b) permits states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state.22
Assuming the Supreme Court finds jurisdiction to rule on Windsor this term,23 it will
determine whether Congress may define marriage for federal purposes as between one
man and one woman. How the Court decides will also determine whether states may
continue to deny recognition of same-sex marriages performed out-of-state. Since one of
the biggest obstacles to divorce for same-sex couples is state courts’ refusal to recognize
same-sex marriage, the Court’s ruling in Windsor will directly affect the ability of samesex couples to divorce.
This Article explores the various legal arguments for holding the Defense of
Marriage Act unconstitutional, considers their implications forsame-sex divorce, and
explains why thoseimplications matter. Part I examines the history of the Defense of
Marriage Act and the various rationales for holding the legislation unconstitutional.
While it is likely the Supreme Court will strike down the federal Defense of Marriage
Act, there is a distinct possibility the Court will craft a narrow decision. In such a
decision, the Court may find that not all states are required to perform same-sex
marriages but may permit states to maintain or enact their own state legislation that
resembles the federal Defense of Marriage Act. Part II explains why under such a regime,
same-sex divorce is a serious problem the Court should consider when reaching its
decision this spring. Part III proposes a possible solution for same-sex couples seeking
divorces, arguing that even if states may continue to forbid performing same-sex
marriage, they should be required to recognize same-sex marriage for purposes of divorce
proceedings. These states should make their courts available for same-sex couples who
were married out-of-state and wish to divorce. If states are not required to do so, samesex couples may be bound in unworkable marriages indefinitely and may thereby be
denied their fundamental right to divorce.

21

Both scholars and the media have used the term. See Mary Patricia Byrn& Morgan L. Holcomb,
Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2012); Landau, supra note 9.
22
1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
23
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (granting certiorari to hear the decision).
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SAME-SEX COUPLES HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY AND DIVORCE:
ERADICATING DOMA

Although the Supreme Court has yet to acknowledge the same-sex right to
marriage,24 more than a decade ago, scholars argued that America was “on the verge of
legalizing same-sex ‘marriage’ by way of a court-ordered redefinition of marriage . . .
.”25Nevertheless, we are not quite there yet, as less than one-quarter of states have
legalized same-sex marriage, and the Court is not required to decide whether there is a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage.At the end of this term, however, the Supreme
Court will rule on the validity of the Defense of Marriage Act, the federal law commonly
known as DOMA, which defines marriage as between a man and a woman.26 The Court
will also rule on the constitutionality of Proposition 8, a California constitutional
amendment adopted via a 2008 ballot initiative that extinguished same-sex couples’ right
to marry—a right established by the Supreme Court of California earlier that year.27
Although I remain uncertain how the Court will rule on Proposition 8—it seems
unlikely that the Court will recognize same-sex marriage as a fundamental right but
instead reach a narrow decision28—this Article will focus on the Defense of Marriage
Act. It seems likely the Court will strike down the Defense of Marriage Act this term.29
During his confirmation hearings, Attorney General Eric Holder declared, “The duty of
the Justice Department is to defend statutes that have been passed by Congress, unless
24

Some argue this is in part due to America’s moral repulsion against same-sex marriage; others argue it is
in part due to that opening the door for condoning polygamy. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge & William
C. Duncan, Reaffirming Marriage: A Presidential Priority, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL’Y 623, 640 (2001);
George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. &POL’Y 581, 628–31 (1999).
25
Organ & Duncan, supra note 24, at 627.
26
1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2006) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.”). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) which declares that:
Certain acts, records, and proceedings and the effect thereof No State, territory, or
possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or
tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, ortribe, or a right
or claim arising from such relationship.
27
See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010). See also In Re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
28
Some scholars believe the Court should rule narrowly so as not to forbid mini-DOMAs. See William
Eskridge& Hans Johnson, Commentary on Marriage Grants: Marriage Equality’s Cinderella Moment,
SCOTUS BLOG (Dec. 9, 2012, 2:10AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/12/commentary-on-marriagegrants-marriage-equalitys-cinderella-moment/ (“[t]here is good precedent for this narrow approach.”). See
also Kenji Yoshino, Commentary on Marriage Grants: Different Ways of Splitting the Difference—The
Menu of Options in Hollingsworth v. Perry, SCOTUS BLOG, (Dec. 8, 2012, 9:48 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/12/commentary-on-marriage-grants-different-ways-of-splitting-thedifference-the-menu-of-options-in-hollingsworth-v-perry/ (There are at least five ways in which the Court
may rule).
29
See, e.g.,Michael J. Klarman, “Gay Rights May Get Its Brown v. Board of Education,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/opinion/gay-rights-may-get-its-brown-v-boardof-education.html. (“Conservative justices who value federalism and liberal justices who sympathize with
gay marriage will probably combine to invalidate the act.”); Yoshino, supra note 28 (“[T]he Court will
strike down DOMA. . . . Justices on the right tend to favor state power (relative to federal power); Justices
on the left tend to favor gay rights.”).
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there is some very compelling reason not to.”30 On February 23, 2011, the Attorney
General informed Congress that after careful consideration, including a recommendation
from the President, the Justice Department would no longer defend Section 3 of the
Defense of Marriage Act, the portion of the act limiting marriage to “a legal union
between one man and one woman.”31 Attorney General Holder continued that together he
and the President concluded Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.32 Most recently, the President publically
reaffirmed his commitment to the cause when he declared that “[o]ur journey is not
complete until our gay brothers and sisters are treated like anyone else under the law, for
if we are truly created equal, then surely the love we commit to one another must be
equal, as well.”33 Still, Attorney General Holder explained that the President has
instructed the Executive Branch to continue to comply with DOMA “unless and until
Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the
law’s constitutionality.”34 Even if the Court chooses this path, it will be interesting to see
which of the several rationales available the Court chooses to strike down the law. There
are legitimate arguments that DOMA is unconstitutional based on the Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. If the Court finds DOMA unconstitutional, whichever rationale it chooses will
have a significant effect on the ability of individual states to continue to ban both the
performance and recognition of same-sex marriage and therefore, on the ability of
individual states to forbid same-sex divorce.
A.

History of DOMA

Congress adopted the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 as a direct response to a
lawsuit brought by three same-sex couples in Hawaii challenging the Hawaii Department
of Health’s denial of marriage licenses on the ground that same-sex couples could not
marry.35 At the time, no major national gay rights organization supported the lawsuit for
fear it would lose and thereby hurt the cause.36 Gay rights organizations also feared a
lawsuit would create backlash from gay rights opponents who may have feared
thatgeneral anti-discrimination laws would lead to same-sex marriage37—a fact
30

Nomination of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Nominee to be Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 112 (2009).
31
Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb.
23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html [hereinafter Letter]; 1 U.S.C.A. §
7 (2006). Although Eric Holder has publically declared Section 3 to be unconstitutional, Paul Clement will
be arguing on behalf of its constitutionality this spring. See generally Brief for Respondent The Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives on the Merits, United States v. Windsor
(2013), (No. 05-1631), 2013 WL 267026.
32
Letter, supra note 31.
33
Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013).
34
Id.
35
H.R. REP. NO.104-664, 2 (1996) (“[DOMA] is a response to a very particular development in the State of
Hawaii.”). See alsoBaehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
36
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR 48 (2012) (“In 1989 . . . executive director of
Lambda Legal, stated, ‘As far as I can tell, no gay organization of any size, local or national, has yet
declared the right to marry as one of its goals.’”).
37
Id. at 55, 216.See also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that forbidding same-sex couples from civil marriage violated the state constitution).
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which,although later proved true, leaders did not wish to concede. Even though the
Hawaii case was not the first attempt to legalize same-sex marriage,38 it may have been
the first time the notion that a state would permit same-sex marriage became real. While
the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings to the Hawaii Department of Health, the
Hawaii Supreme Court reversed, holding that the three plaintiffs were entitled to an
evidentiary hearing regarding their Equal Protection claim.39 Additionally, the court held
thestate had discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their sex, and therefore,
their Equal Protection claim would be subject to heightened scrutiny.40The case was
remanded to determine whether Hawaii had a compelling reason to exclude same-sex
couples from marriage.41Before the trial court had the opportunity to rule on the case, the
Hawaiian legislature tried to makeit explicit that same-sex couples could not marry.42
As a result, Congress was concerned that “[t]he prospect of permitting
homosexual couples to ‘marry’ in Hawaii threaten[ed] to have very real consequences. .
.”43 Congress particularly worried that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states that
believed same-sex marriage to be repugnant would have been forced to recognize and
give binding legal effect to same-sex unions performed in other states.44 Moreover,
Congress wanted to stop what it viewed to be an “orchestrated legal assault” against
traditional heterosexual marriage.45
Accordingly, Congress passed DOMA with two goals in mind. The first was “to
defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage.”46 The second was “to protect
the right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition
of same-sex unions, free from any federal constitutional implications that might attend
the recognition by one State of the right for homosexual couples to acquire marriage
licenses.”47 Although the main purpose of DOMA appears to be protecting the institution
of heterosexual marriage, Congress also acknowledged the legislation would advance two
additional governmental interests: “protecting state sovereignty and democratic selfgovernance”—a Tenth Amendment consideration—and “preserving scarce government
resources.”48
Despite the controversy that surrounds DOMAtoday,49 the bill made its way
through Congress quickly and with overwhelming support. In July, the House passed
38

See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 54 (Free Press 1996)
(discussing the National Coalition of Gay Organization’s 1972 attempt to repeal all legislative provisions
restricting marriage to one man and one woman).
39
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
40
Id. at 65–67.
41
Id.
42
1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217. Although the trial court ultimately ruled that Hawaii had no compelling
justification for excluding same-sex couples from marriage, Baehr v. Miike, NO. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), the Hawaii Supreme Court eventually vacated the trial court’s decision and
directed the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit in light of the State’s new mini-DOMA. Baehr v. Miike, 994
P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).
43
H.R. REP. NO.104-664, 2 (1996).
44
Id.See alsoU.S. Const. Art. IV, §1.
45
H.R. REP. NO.104-664, 2 (1996).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 12.
49
See, e.g.,KLARMAN,supra note 36, at 119, 161.
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DOMA by a vote of 342 to 67,50 and by September, the Senate passed the bill by 85 to
14.51DOMA sped through Congress in part due to many Congressmen’s deep-rooted
homophobic views.52On September 21, 1996, late at night and without a public
ceremony, President Clinton signed DOMA into law.53
Following the passage of DOMA, the United States remains divided on the issue
of same-sex marriage. While some states later moved in the direction of legalizing samesex marriage, even before DOMA was passed, many states were already taking antisame-sex marriage measures. However, in 2003, Massachusetts became the first of now
twelvestates and the District of Columbia to legalize same-sex marriage.54 In these twelve
states and the District of Columbia, DOMA still applies.Therefore, it still prevents
married same-sex couples from using their marital status to benefit from the more than
1100 federal rights statutes and programs, including tax and employment benefits,55
whose administration in part turns on one’s marital status.56 At the other end of the
spectrum, several states have taken affirmative steps to forbid same-sex marriage within
their borders. The non-recognition of out-of-state marriages is not a new phenomenon;
rather, states have always had the ability to refuse to recognize out-of-state marriages that
clearly violate those states’ public policies.57 Whether states may constitutionally ban
same-sex marriage under this exception remains unanswered. Still, a majority of states
have adopted their own mini-DOMAs, both banning the performance of same-sex
marriage and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state.58 Some of
these mini-DOMAs include express language that state recognition of same-sex marriage
would violate public policy.59 In total, thirty-sevenstates have either constitutional
amendments or statutory provisions that define marriage as a civil unionbetween a man

50

142 CONG. REC. 17094-95 (1996).
Id.
52
Brief on the Merits for Respondent at 9, United States v. Windsor, (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL
701228.
53
KLARMAN,supra note 36, at 63.
54
See generally Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (holding that forbidding same-sex couples from civil
marriage violated the state constitution).
55
See, e.g.,Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (D. Mass. 2010)
aff'd, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
56
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR
REPORT 1 (2004) (identifying 1138 federal laws upon which one’s martial status is a factor).
57
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE
LINES 117 (2006). See also Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate,38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353 (2005) (arguing that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause only applies to judgments and therefore has no effect on a state’s decision to recognize
same-sex marriage).
58
See Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook
for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2166–94 (2005). It is noteworthy that Maryland, New Hampshire,
and Wyoming each adopted bans on same-sex marriage before the 1993 Baehr case. Id. at 2165; MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:2 (1987); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101
(1977).
59
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2004), ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004).
750 ILL.COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (1998).
51
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and a woman.60The Supreme Court may ban these state mini-DOMAs either by finding a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage or by invalidating DOMA on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds. If the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate
DOMA, this would make it extremely difficult for mini-DOMAs to stand as they
discriminate in the same manner as the federal law. The Court could also rely on the
Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism to invalidate DOMA, which would still
permit state mini-DOMAs to persist. If the Court ultimately chooses to strike down
DOMA, the rationale it chooses will have serious consequences forthe constitutionality of
mini-DOMAs and the rights accessible to same-sex married couples, including the right
to divorce.
B.

Reasons to Strike down DOMA and recognize a national right to same-sex
marriage
1.

DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause

There are several arguments tied to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause, which, if accepted, would lead the Court to find a federal ban on the recognition
of same-sex marriage unconstitutional. The first argument is that such a ban constitutes
sex discrimination and should be stricken under intermediate scrutiny.61 Although some
refuse to view the prohibition of same-sex marriage as a matter of sex
discriminationbecause it applies equally to both men and women,62 individuals are being
denied the right to marry solely because of their sex.63 That is, if Abby wants to marry
Caroline, she is denied the right for the sole reason that she is a woman. Had Abby been
born a man (or in some jurisdictions even transitioned into a man), the law would allow
Abby to marry Caroline. In many respects, this argument echoes the notion that past
miscegenation laws discriminated on the basis of race even though they applied equally
to Caucasians and African Americans.64 If the Court chooses this path, DOMA will only
stand if it is substantially related to an important government interest.65
Second, the Court may invalidate DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause as
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sexualorientation. Indeed, this was the
60

Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NCSL,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx#2 (last visited May
17, 2013).
61
See, e.g.,Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993) (J. Levison) (explaining that restricting marriage
to a man and a woman violates the state constitution’s equal protection clause on the basis of sexdiscrimination because “on its face and as applied, [the statute] regulates access to the marital status and its
concomitant rights and benefits on the basis of the applicants' sex.”). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
199 (1976) (holding that gender discrimination warrants intermediate scrutiny).
62
See MACKINNON,supra note 20, at 1065–69. See alsoGoodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (does not mention
gender discrimination in holding Massachusetts must recognize same-sex marriage).
63
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 218–28
(1999)(arguing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination).
64
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
65
The Government’s brief on the merits which argues DOMA fails intermediate scrutiny as “[n]one of
Section 3’s actual purposes as expressed in the House Report, or any of the additional interests now
asserted . . . substantially further[] an important governmental objective,” Brief for the United States on the
Merits at 14, United States v. Windsor (2013), (No. 12-307) and the lower court’s decision in Windsor v.
United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2012), discussed infra, may be used to support this claim.
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argument the Second Circuit ultimately adopted in Windsor to hold DOMA
unconstitutional.66 It was also the rationale used by the Supreme Court of Connecticut67
and the Supreme Court of Iowa,68 which both held laws restricting civil marriage to
heterosexual couples violated their state constitutions’ equal protection clauses.
Additionally, it is the argument set forth in the Government’s brief on the merits in the
upcoming Supreme Court case.69 In Windsor, the Second Circuit foundthat DOMA
discriminated on the basis of sexualorientation, and discrimination on the basis of
sexualorientation required intermediate scrutiny.70 The court rejected the four
justifications for DOMA: to (1) maintain a uniform definition of marriage; (2) protect the
fiscal treasury; (3) preserve a traditional understanding of marriage; and, (4) encourage
responsible procreation.71 The court rejected the first rationale as being of unprecedented
breadth and not “exceedingly persuasive” as the law itself “creates more discord and
anomaly than uniformity.”72 The court quickly rejected the second rationale, explaining
DOMA is “so broad . . . that it is not substantially related to fiscal matters.”73Recently,
the Government has added the argument that even if DOMA “actually saves the
government money (a dubious assertion), that rationale would not suffice under
heightened scrutiny.”74The court denied the third rationale, as “DOMA does not, strictly
speaking, preserve the institution of marriage as one between a man and a woman [as the
decision to permit such marriages is left to the states].”75 Regarding the fourth argument,
the court questioned whether a rational basis even existed regarding the connection
between DOMA and encouraging responsible procreation.76
Currently, only a few courts, including one federal appellate court, have
recognized sexualorientation as requiring intermediate scrutiny for purposes of equal
protection analysis,77 thereby placing a higher burden on the government. Although the
Supreme Court has yet to apply heightened scrutiny to discrimination on the basis of

66

Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181–88.
Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub.Health, 957 A.2d 407, 425–61 (Conn. 2008).
68
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885–904 (Iowa 2009).
69
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 476–481; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896–906; Brief for the United States on the
Merits, United States v. Windsor (2013), (No. 12-307).
70
See generally Windsor, 699 F.3d 169.
71
Id. at 185–88.
72
Id. at 186.
73
Id. at 187.But cf. Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding
such a claim would pass rational basis review as “Congress could rationally have believed that DOMA
would reduce costs.”).
74
Brief for the United States on the Merits, United States v. Windsor (2013), (No. 12-307) at 15 (citing
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982)).
75
Windsor, 699 F.3d at 187.
76
See id. at 182–83
77
See, e.g., id. at 185–88 (declaring that homosexuals should receive heightened scrutiny due to the fact (a)
they have faced historical discrimination, (b) that homosexuality has no relation to homosexuals’ ability to
contribute to society, (c) that homosexuals comprise a discernible group, and (d) that the class represents a
politically weakened minority). But see Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st
Cir. 2012) (“[E]xtending intermediate scrutiny to sexual preference classifications is not a step open to
us.”).
67
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sexualorientation,78 there is some possibility the Court will apply such scrutiny this
spring.79Because the Court has never considered applying heightened scrutiny to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation—it has previously employed a minimum
rationality test to strike down laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation80—
applying heightened scrutiny would not require the Court to overturn precedent.
Additionally, Attorney General Holder and President Obama have expressly requested
that the Court apply intermediate scrutiny to strike down DOMA.81Specifically, the
Government argues that classifications based on sexual-orientation warrant heightened
scrutiny because: (1) there is a significant history of discrimination against gay and
lesbian people;82 (2) sexual orientation bears no relation to one’s ability to participate in
and contribute to society;83 (3) sexual orientation is an immutable or distinguishing
characteristic;84 and, (4) gay and lesbian people comprise a minority group with limited
political power.85
These arguments notwithstanding, Professors Michael Klarman and William
Eskridge believe the Government’s brief will have little influence.86 The respondents
argue heightened scrutiny should not apply since gays and lesbians are not politically
powerless but “one of the most influential, best-connected, best-funded, and bestorganized interest groups in modern politics.”87 They also argue there is no longstanding
history of discrimination,88 and sexual orientation is not an immutable trait.89 If the Court
were to adopt intermediate scrutiny, it would have broad implications far beyond DOMA,
and therefore, the Court may not be willing to do so. Even if the Court chooses to adopt
rational basis review, the likelihood of which remains uncertain, there is a strong
78

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (employing rational basis to decide a case of discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (refusing to employ
heightened scrutiny to perceived discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
79
See Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817–18 (2008) (arguing that Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558,
requires sexual orientation discrimination receive intermediate scrutiny); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (hearing en banc denied, 680 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.
2012)). There is also an argument under the traditional Carolene Products analysis that LGBTQ
community constitutes a class of “discrete and insular minorities” being denied access to the political
system and therefore in need of heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis. United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4. See also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124HARV. L.
REV. 747, 761–62 (2011) (“[I]t is certainly possible that the Court may give formal heightened scrutiny to
another classification or two in addition to the five that currently benefit from this form of judicial review.
The fact that state courts have given legislation burdening gays strict or ‘quasi-suspect’ scrutiny under their
state constitutions, for instance, may inspire federal courts to do the same.”).
80
See generally Lawrence,539 U.S. 558; Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
81
Letter, supra note 31.
82
Brief for the United States on the Merits at 22–27, United States v. Windsor (2013), (No. 12-307).
83
Id. at 27–29.
84
Id. at 27–32.
85
Id. at 14(“[T]he fact that gay and lesbian people have achieved some political gains does not tilt this
factor against, let alone preclude, heightened scrutiny.”).
86
See Miranda Leitsinger, Obama’s Supreme Court Brief on Same-sex Marriage Will Have Little Impact:
Experts, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2013, 10:46 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/28/17138448obamas-supreme-court-brief-on-same-sex-marriage-will-have-little-impact-experts?lite.
87
Brief on the Merits for Respondent at 53, United States v. Windsor, (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL
701228.
88
Id. at 57.
89
Id. at 54–56.
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argument that any ban on same-sex marriageis unconstitutional because such bans
constitute bare animus.
Under traditional rational basis review, courts are very lenient toward policies that
may be discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite this lenient standard,
there is an argument that refusing to allow same-sex couples the right to marry violates
rational basis review as interpreted under its bare animus standard.90 The Supreme Court
has emphasized“[i]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of laws’ means
anything, it must at the very least mean that bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate interest.”91 Using this logic, the
Court has struck down four laws which denied benefits to individuals on the sole basis
the group was denied benefits because of the legislatures’ animosity toward those
particular groups.
In U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,the Court introduced the notion of bare
animus by striking down a law that prevented unrelated individuals living together in a
house from receiving food stamps.92 The Court reasoned that the legislature passed the
law only to manifest its desire to harm a politically unpopular group, hippies, and that in
order to survive rational basis, the law required more than a discriminatory purpose. The
Court insisted a “purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and
without reference to (some independent) considerations in the public interest, justify [the
classification].”93 Moreover, the Court declared that despite the independent interests
present, such as safeguarding the health and well-being of the population, as well as
alleviating hunger and malnutrition by increasing food security for low-income
households, those interests were insufficient to hold the law constitutional, as the
mandated classification of excluding households with non-related individuals proved
irrelevant to those stated interests.94
Nearly a decade after Moreno, the Supreme Court returned to the notion of
impermissible animus in two cases. In Palmore v. Sidotti, the Court overturned a family
court’s order to grant custody to a father so that the child would avoid bias by living with
his mother who was in a biracial relationship.95 Again, the Court was unwilling to give
effect to what it perceived to be nothing other than animus, in this instance, against
biracial relationships.96 Then, in City of Cleburne v.Cleburne Living Center, the Court
struck down a municipal zoning ordinance that required a special use permit for operating
certain group homes, including “[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded.”97 The case
was brought by Cleburne Living Center, which wished to operate a group home for
90

Cf. Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 682 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (although the Court
does not use the term “bare animus,” it seems to employ a heightened form of rational basis to ultimately
strike down DOMA).
91
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis in original).
92
Id. at 528.
93
Id. at 534–35 (internal quotations omitted).
94
Id. at 533–35 (“[T]o be sustained, the challenged classification must rationally further some legitimate
governmental interest other than . . . to prevent so-called [sic] ‘hippies' and ‘hippie communes' from
participating in the [federal] food stamp program.”).
95
See Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
96
Id.at 433 (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect.”).
97
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 436 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).
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thirteen intellectually disabled individuals but was denied a special use permit at a public
hearing.98 The Court reasoned the ordinance requiring the special use permits was
unconstitutional because it was motivated solely by an “irrational prejudice” against the
intellectually disabled.99 In both of these cases, the Court was stern in its judgmentthat
prejudice against a politically unpopular group is insufficient to withstand a rational basis
review of constitutionality.
Although the facts of Cleburne are not directly analogous to those in the same-sex
marriage cases, thatdecision is particularly pertinent today as it could have direct
consequences on the Court’s ruling on DOMA. In deciding Cleburne, the Court debated
whether people with intellectual disabilities should receive heightened scrutiny as a
class.100Ultimately, the Court reasoned they should not. Instead, the Court relied on the
“irrational prejudice” of the ordinance to rule in favor of Cleburne Living Center.101
Similarly, if the Court takes an equal protection approach to decidingDOMA’s
constitutionality, it could employ intermediate scrutiny102 but would more likely revert to
employing rational basis review.
Most similar to the situation at hand, Romer v. Evans103 examined a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of Colorado’s 1992 Amendment 2,which adopted a
popular referendum that prohibited all legislative, executive, and judicial action designed
to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexualorientation.104 The effect
of the law was not only to prevent future action but also to repeal existing gay-friendly
statutes, notably in Aspen and Boulder, which barred discrimination on the basis of
sexualorientation.105 Without addressing whether sexualorientation should receive
heightened scrutiny, the Court employed rational basis review to strike down Colorado’s
Amendment 2 because it had no legitimate purpose but was “born of animosity” toward
gays, with a goal “to make them [gays] unequal to everyone else.”106 The Court rejected
the State’s argument that Amendment 2 simply placed lesbians and gays in the same
position as others by removing a cause of action for discrimination on the basis of their
sexualorientation but instead reasoned that the law “impose[d] a[n impermissible] special
98

Id.at 435.
Id.at 450.
100
Id.at 442–447. The Court was required to address this argument as the Court of Appeals held in favor of
the plaintiffs using intermediate scrutiny. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197
(5th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e conclude that although mental retardates are not a suspect class, they do share
enough of the characteristics of a suspect class to warrant heightened scrutiny.”).
101
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
102
See generallyWindsor, 699 F.3d 169 (explaining DOMA discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation
thus requiring intermediate scrutiny).
103
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
104
Amendment 2 read:
Neither the State of Colorado . . . nor any of its agencies . . . shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination. . . . Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
105
Id. at 623–24.See also Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 911
(2012) (explaining the legislative history of Amendment 2, whose record was full of anti-homosexual
sentiments).
106
Id. at 621.
99
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disability upon those persons alone.”107The Court went on to analyze whether
Amendment 2 withstood rational basis review and ultimately concluded the amendment
was unconstitutional.108 This case demonstrates the Court will not permit legislation
designed to target politically unpopular group.
Despite the inherent similarities to Romer, it may be argued that the inability of
same-sex couples to divorce is actually more similar to Moreno and Cleburne. The laws
in each case were motivated by animus and resulted in economic disadvantages to the
unpopular groups. Specifically, hippies were unable to access the federal government’s
welfare program because of their lifestyle choices, and the facility for the intellectually
disabled was unable to access a desired permit. Similarly, DOMA prevents same-sex
couples from accessing,among a long list of benefits, the financial benefits of marriage.
The concept of bare animus could be crucial in an equal protection analysis of
DOMA or of same-sex marriage generally;without clear evidence of bare animus,
plaintiffs almost always lose under traditional rational basis review.109 This is particularly
important because the Court has never indicated it would be willing to adopt heightened
scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Assuming the Court does
use a rational basis standard, the animus rationale could be an easy route to hold DOMA
unconstitutional without forcing the Court to determine whether discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation warrants heightened scrutiny.110 As Professor Laurence Tribe
explained nearly a decade ago:
For what, after all, could be the rationale for permitting an otherwise
eligible same-sex couple to enjoy the tangible benefits and assume the
legal obligations of some version of civil union but withholding from them
that final measure of respect . . . ? What could be the rationale for refusing
two men or two women the full symbolic benefits of civil marriage so
long as the state remains in the business of licensing within secular, civil
law a status that no doubt piggybacks on its nonsecular counterparts in
religious marriage? Plainly, the rationale must be the state’s disapproval of
the same-sex couple's expression of dissatisfaction with a second-class
version of the marital bond; the rationale must be to demand for oppositesex couples complete dominion over the last vestiges of gender privilege
in civil law.111
107

Id. at 631.
Id. at 633 (The Court reasoned, Amendment 2 “is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons
by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board.”).
109
See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 370 (1999) (explaining that between 1971 and 1999, of the
110 Supreme Court cases decided, employing rational basis review, only ten plaintiffs prevailed on their
claims). See alsoMass. v. Dep’t of Health, 682 F.3d at 9 (“Equal protection claims tested by this rational
basis standard, famously called by Justice Holmes the ‘last resort of constitutional argument,’ rarely
succeed.”) (internal citations omitted).
110
Cf.Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (“The absence of any reasonable relationship between, on the one
hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter into civil marriage and, on the
other, protection of public health, safety, or general welfare, suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted
in persistent prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to be) homosexual.”).
111
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak its Name, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1945–46 (2004). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
108
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The challenge in applying the bare animus rationale would be that if the Court took this
approach, all states would be required to recognize same-sex marriage, a move for which
the Court may not be ready.112If the Court holds DOMA to be unconstitutional under a
rational basis review, it must find no rational basis for the law. Once the Court makes this
finding, it would be nearly impossible for states to come up with a rational basis for
upholding their mini-DOMAs. Because mini-DOMAs would remain discriminatory on
the basis of sexual orientation without a rational basis to support that discrimination,
mini-DOMAs would also be unconstitutional, and all states would not only be forced to
recognize same-sex marriage within their borders but also be forced to perform such
unions. A similar problem would develop if the Court used any of the equal protection
analyses to hold DOMA unconstitutional. For if the Court were to hold that defining
marriage as between one man and one woman for federal purposes constitutes
impermissible discrimination, a state law that discriminated in the same manner would
almost certainly also be considered impermissible discrimination. The Court may also
fear the political consequences if it applies this analysis;if DOMA is analyzed and
ultimately held unconstitutional under an equal protection analysis, it is possiblethat its
supporters will be branded as “prejudiced bigots.”113Although there are several strong
arguments that DOMA is unconstitutional as it violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause, the Court will likely avoid this analysis.
2.

DOMA violates the Due Process Clause

The Court could also use the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to find that there exists a fundamental right to marriage for same-sex couples and
therefore find DOMA unconstitutional. Although none of the lower courts employed this
tactic to hold a same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional, a viable argument does exist.114
The due process argument begins with the Supreme Court’s declaration that “[m]arriage
is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and
survival.”115 The Court has overturned restrictions against interracial marriage,116 onerous
restrictions on marriages involving a prisoner,117 and a law that preventedindividuals who
were delinquent on child support payments from marrying.118 Some scholars argue that a
dissenting) (“[P]reserving the traditional institution of marriage is just a kinder way of describing the
State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples.”) (internal quotations omitted).
112
Yoshino, supra note 28 (arguing that the Court will likely find a way to strike down DOMA without
requiring the forty-one States that do not currently recognize same-sex marriage to do so).
113
Robert Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 99–100 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court avoided the equal protection route in Lawrence
because doing so would have either turned sexual-orientation into a suspect classification, or because it
would have had to find that the anti-sodomy law was created due to animus, thereby “branding supporters
of anti-sodomy laws as prejudiced bigots”).
114
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV L. REV. 747, 748 (2010) (“the Court has moved
away from group-based equality claims under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
individual liberty claims under the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
115
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
116
Id.
117
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
118
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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ban on same-sex marriage is similar to a ban on interracial marriage.119 Moreover, if
marriage truly were one of the “basic civil rights of man,” it would seem odd that
homosexuals cannot exercise that right. Although extending the fundamental right to
heterosexual marriage to a fundamental right to marriage in generalwould require a small
logical step by the Court, such a step is not inconceivable. If the Court is unwilling to
recognize a fundamental right to same-sex marriage this spring, it seems likely that it or
Congress will in the future.120
3.

DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment

The Supreme Courthas acknowledged on several occasions that “[m]arriage has
traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, and,
consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state control by the
Tenth Amendment.”121 Indeed, when the Constitution was written in 1787, the issue of
marriage was never raised because it was understood that regulating marriage was an
exercise of state police power.122 By then, the states had already set up detailed marriage
laws and regulations as a means of establishing public order.123
Today, states have a significant amount of flexibility “in setting marriage
requirements, including regulations related to age of consent, mental capacity, [and]
consanguinity.”124 The Tenth Amendment argument against DOMA is simply that the
federal government does not have the authority to regulate marriage in this manner. Prior
to the passage of DOMA in 1993, Congress had never before attempted to pass such
sweeping regulations on marriage.125 Under traditional Tenth Amendment jurisprudence,
a violation of the Tenth Amendment occurs only when the federal government is found to
have commandeered state governments.126 Although the First Circuit found DOMA did
not constitute a violation of the Tenth Amendment,127 a lower Massachusetts court found

119

Kim Forde-Mazrui, Live and Let Love: Self-Determination in Matters of Intimacy and Identity,101
MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2200–07 (2003) (reviewing RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX,
MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003)) (finding many parallels between the opposition to same-sex
intimacy and anti-miscegenation ideology). See alsoBaehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
120
SeeKLARMAN,supra note 36, at 193–207; Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional
Inevitability of Same-Sex Marriage,71 MD. L. REV. 471, 479–80 (2012).
121
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (declaring that the regulation of
marriage is “an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.”); Baehr,
852 P.2d at 58 (“The power to regulate marriage is a sovereign function reserved exclusively to the
respective states.”); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (“The whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife . . . belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States.”).
122
See Affidavit of Nancy Cott, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 2010 WL
604595, para 10 (D. Mass.). But see Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of
Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 132 (2004) (explaining that
Utah was required to ban polygamy before becoming a State).
123
Cott, supra note 122, at para. 9.
124
Lauren Brown & Jena Shoaf, eds., Marriage and Divorce, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 493, 495 (2011).
125
Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 12.
126
SeePrintz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992).
127
Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 11.
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such a violation.128 Specifically, the lower court found DOMA violated the Tenth
Amendment by regulating the states as states because it affects federal grants and costs,
concerns attributes of state sovereignty, and is “of such a nature that compliance would
impair a state’s ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.”129Finding a Tenth Amendment violation would merely require the Court to
find that Congress has overstepped its authority. If the Supreme Court wants to avoid a
decisionon the constitutionality of same-sex marriage for the time being, this appears to
be the best option.130 Even if DOMA is declared unconstitutional, by this rationale, miniDOMAs would remain constitutional.
4.

DOMA violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause

When DOMA was initially passed, many believed that it violated the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. In particular, many felt that Section 2 of the Act, which allows states
to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state, violates the
Constitution’s requirement that each state must fully credit “the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state.”131The Full Faith and Credit Clause also permits
Congress to enact general laws to “prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”132The Supreme Court has said that
this clause transformed states from “independent foreign sovereignties, each free to
ignore rights and obligations. . .of others” into “integral part[s] of a single nation, in
which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application.”133 It
has also been said that the Full Faith and Credit Clause “serves to coordinate the
administration of justice among the several independent legal systems which exist in our
Federation.”134 These reasons may explain why the Continental Congress included a
similar clause in the Articles of Confederation.135 The Constitutional Convention left the
clause mainly intact, but extended it to include public acts and records, as well as an
effects clause.136
“During the Congressional debates surrounding DOMA, many worried whether
the bill would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”137 For example, in 1996, Senator

128

Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 249–252 (D. Mass.
2010) aff'd, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
129
Id.
130
But see Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, An Ephemeral Moment: Minimalism, Equality, and
Federalism in the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage Rights, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 199, 210
(2013) (“[I]f LGBT litigation strategies result in a more robust articulation of the Court’s federalism
doctrine, negative consequences may follow in other contexts that LGBT advocates (and other
progressives) consider important including seemingly far afield issues of regulatory and economic policy . .
. .”).
131
U.S. CONST. art.IV, § 1.
132
Id.
133
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943).
134
Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV
1, 2 (1945).
135
Id. at 3.
136
Id. at 4.
137
28 U.S.C. §1738C (2006).But see Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
(“DOMA is an example of Congress exercising its powers under the Full Faith and Credit Clause . . . .
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Kennedy declared DOMA was “plainly unconstitutional,”138 articulating that although the
Full Faith and Credit Clause gives Congress authority to prescribe the effect of one
state’s laws in other states, “[it] does not give Congress the power to say that any such
laws shall have no effect.”139 During this period, Laurence Tribe also argued that “[t]he
Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot be read as a fount of authority for Congress to set
asunder the states that this clause so solemnly brought together.”140Tribe explained that
the enforcement clause permitting Congressional action does not permit Congress to
create a categorical exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.141Tribe argued that
such a reading “would convert the Constitution's most vital unifying clause into a license
for balkanization and disunity.”142Despite its long history and visible connection to
DOMA, neither the First Circuit nor the Second Circuit mentioned any connection with
the Clause during their decisions involving DOMA.143Still, there is a legitimate argument
that DOMA is unconstitutional under this rationale. Moreover, by holding DOMA
unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court would not be forced to
strike down state mini-DOMAs.
However, it should be noted that a Full Faith and Credit Clause argument is not
quite this simple. There exists a well-recognized public policy exception to traditional
conflict of law problems whereby an individual state need not respect the acts, records, or
judicial proceedings of another state if deemed contrary to that state’s public policy.144
Indeed, several of the mini-DOMAs include express language indicating that recognizing
same-sex marriage is contrary to public policy.145For the Court to hold DOMA
unconstitutional under the public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it
would need to invalidate those state public policy decisions. This is possible since the
Court seems unwilling to recognize the moral disapproval of homosexuality as a
legitimate public policy concern.146Still, there may be other rationales to justify the
application of the exception. Whether the Court could recognize an assault to the tradition
of marriage as a legitimate public policy concern is a more open question. On this issue,
the First Circuit was explicit that defending traditional heterosexual marriage and
traditional notions of morality failed constitutional scrutiny.147
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MINI-DOMAS PREVENT SAME-SEX COUPLES FROM ACCESSING COURTS

Although few advocates for same-sex marriage want to talk about divorce, with
such a high divorce rate, same-sex marriage advocates should be thinking about divorce,
especially if same-sex marriage continues to be acknowledged in some states and not
others. The right to marry typically carries with it the right to divorce.However, only
some states recognize same-sex marriage, and many states have residency requirements
for divorce. Therefore in at least some states, same-sex couples have the right to marry
without the corollary right to divorce. If the Court invalidates DOMA but permits states
to choose whether or not to perform or even recognize same-sex unions, many same-sex
couples will continue to find themselves without access to divorce. Whether same-sex
wedlock will remain a problem depends for the most part on how the Court rules in
Windsor.148
Meanwhile, it is important to understand the trauma faced by same-sex couples
unable to access state courts for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. To understand the
extent of the problem of marital wedlock, it is important to understandwhy people get
divorced and how divorce affects an individual in the future. Although many believe
divorce is a modern phenomenon, the first American divorce took place in 1637.149
Today, divorce is common in America, and almost 5,000 divorces are granted every
day.150 Despite the emotional and economic trauma often associated with divorces,
married couples are able to end their marriages with relative ease.151
People divorce for a variety of reasons. In the late nineteenth century, it was said
that:
Many causes [for divorce]may arise, physical, moral, and intellectual,
such as the contracting by one of the parties of an incurable disease like
leprosy, or confirmed insanity, or hopeless idiocy, or a conviction of a
felony, which would render the continuance of the marriage relation
intolerable to the other party. . . .152
Today, individuals continue to divorce for countless reasons. Among others, individuals
may choose to end marriage because their spouseswereunfaithful, the marriage has grown
stale or unsatisfying, or the marriage is damaging in some way.153It has been said that
“[t]he primary effect to be accomplished by a divorce or dissolution is the separation of
the parties in a manner that enables each to continue his or her life as free[ly] as possible.
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. . .”154 Moreover, divorce itself “provides a framework within which divorcing couples
can themselves determine their post-dissolution rights and responsibilities.”155 Divorce
not only provides couples with an orderly means by which they can divide their assets
and separate their financial relationship but also grants individuals an emotional ritual of
separation.156 Without the possibility of divorce, couples are bound to each other both
emotionally and legally.157 Although the potential negative consequences of divorce
should not be overlooked (for instance, it is common for one spouse to be left at a
significant economic disadvantage),158 for many the benefits outweigh the disadvantages.
Professor Judith Stinson,who has written on the evolution of American divorce
law, claims that restricting individuals’ ability to divorce is “morally problematic for a
number of reasons”159:
First, when a government forces a person to remain married to an
individual who is no longer of his or her choosing, that person's personal
autonomy is significantly reduced. Second, the perspective that marriage
is, at least in some sense, a contract rather than simply a status suggests
that divorce cannot be prohibited. Third, married persons are often legally
liable for their spouse's actions, even absent consent, and courts should not
shackle a person with unwanted and unintended liability. Finally,
individuals cannot remarry if they remain legally married to another
person.160
These factors appear consistent with the notion that the primary effect of divorce is to
enable freedom and flexibility.161 Still, Stinson does not seem to direct enough attention
to the non-economic entanglement that occurs when married couples are unable to
divorce. Not only will separated same-sex couples married and unable to divorce deal
with legal liability for their spouses’ actions, but they will also continue to be legally tied
to their spouses’lives. Returning to Port and Cowan’s marriage,162 when Port was worried
she would be unable to divorce Cowan, one of her concerns would be the consequences
of Port having children.163 Given the rise of reproductive technology, it is increasingly
common for lesbians to have biological children.164 Specifically, Port was concerned that
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if she remained legally married to Cowan, Cowan would be presumed to have jointcustody of Port’s future child, even if she and Cowan no longer interacted.165
While Cowan and Port’s separation appeared fairly amicable, without access to a
divorce, there is no way to ensure an equitable division of assets.166 Additionally, without
a formal divorce, spouses may not receive alimony or child support even when they
would be entitled to such.167Another issue which may arise if a couple is unable to
divorce is the presumed authority for end-of-life decision making, by which an estranged
spouse could have the final say on whether to grant or withhold life-saving treatment.168
As a result of the many difficulties that arise, at least a few scholars believe that divorce
is a fundamental right and that an individual without access to divorce knows neither
liberty nor justice.169
Nevertheless, it seems likely that this problem will persist for at least a limited
time, as the nation in its entirety does not seem ready to embrace same-sex marriage.
Although “[same-sex marriage] is closer to ordinary than ever before in America,”170 the
nation remains split on the issue. Only forty-eight percent of Americans say they favor
same-sex marriage, while forty-three percent are opposed.171A review of specific states
showsa majority of Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas oppose samesex marriage while only thirty-five percent support its legality.172
If the Court were to strike down DOMA while allowing mini-DOMAs to stand,
those states with such legislation and many others could continue to ban same-sex
marriage through their own legislatures. Indeed, it is possible that if the Court takes a
stance moving in the direction of the nationalization of same-sex marriage, the nation will
see a period of backlash, and individuals in some states may become more hostile to the
LGBTQ community. If the Court allows mini-DOMAs to remain, it should realize the
consequences this will have on same-sex marriage and divorce. While the legal system
typically dictates “when a divorce may occur, how a divorce must be procured, and what
the consequences of divorce will be,”173 in regards to same-sex divorce, the legal system
seems to have gone astray. In 1888, the Supreme Court declared, “it is not perceived that
any principle should prevent the legislature itself from interfering, and putting an end to
the relation [marriage] in the interest of the parties as well as of society.”174 In 1971, the
165
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Court explained due processrequired parties seeking divorce to have a “meaningful
opportunity to be heard.”175And yet today, many married same-sex couples find
themselves trapped in their marriages.
As long as states fail to recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state, it is
likely that couples will find themselves unable to divorce.176If some states acknowledge
same-sex marriage while others do not, individuals who are married in a state which
recognizes same-sex marriage and then move to a state which neither performs nor
recognizes same-sex marriages for any purpose, mayfind themselves unable to receive a
divorce in their new home state. Moreover, due to state laws that requireresidency for
access to state courts for the purpose of divorce, these couples may also be unable to get
divorced in the state in which they originally married.177For instance, Massachusetts’
residency requirement is so strict as to deny court access to those couples who have
“removed into this commonwealth for the purposes of obtaining a divorce.”178 Denying
same-sex couples the right to divorce is a violation of their due process rights and a
serious assault on their personal liberty.
The due process issue of divorce mirrors one addressed by the Supreme Court in
Boddie v. Connecticut.179 There, the Court considered whether a state may limit access to
its divorce courts by charging fees that effectively bar the poor from dissolving an
existing marital bond or from forming another.180The Supreme Court held that, given the
fundamental nature of the marriage relationship and the state’s monopolization of the
means of dissolving that relationship, where a state failed to waive unaffordable divorce
filing fees, the state deprived poor couples of liberty without due process of
law.181Because most states do not recognize same-sex marriage and the Court has
expressly held residency requirements are constitutional,182 the question of same-sex
divorce is slightly more complicated. Still, if a partial ban on divorce in the form of
preventing those who could not afford to pay from obtaining a divorce is
unconstitutional, how is one to defend a complete ban on divorce for same-sex couples?
It took Jessica Port and Virginia Cowan three years to divorce after numerous
expensive, time-consuming, and emotionally draining appeals. Other couples
encountered even more challenges. When Francesca and Donna-Marie Cerutti-O’Brien
decided they were ready to end their marriage, the courts were uncooperative.183 The
couple married in Massachusetts in November 2006 and moved to Florida shortly
175
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thereafter.184 Problems in the relationship arose swiftly, and the couple filed for divorce
in Massachusetts on June 27, 2007.185 After the probate and family court dismissed their
complaint for divorce due toa lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Francesca, determined
to secure a divorce, appealed.186 The Court of Appeals affirmed the probate and family
court’s decision, explaining that although the couple had married in Massachusetts,
because the plaintiff was not continuously domiciled in Massachusetts following the
wedding, the couple did not satisfy the residency requirements of Massachusetts divorce
law, and the case was dismissed.187Because Francesca moved to Florida to be with her
wife following the wedding, the couple was ineligible for divorce in Massachusettsand
elsewhere.188 That same-sex couples are finding themselves trapped in their marriages
with no escape is unacceptable.
III.

STATES WITH SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS SHOULD RECOGNIZE SUCH MARRIAGES
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS.

As this article has demonstrated, one of the many complicated unforeseen issues
surrounding same-sex marriage is the inability of same-sex married couples to divorce.
Although some scholars cannot imagine marriage without its corollary, divorce,189 few
gay-rights activists fought for same-sex marriage with divorce in mind. Instead, they
argue that same-sex couples “needed the law to adapt to the reality of their changing
families” through same-sex marriage or at least the rights associated with
marriage.190Because the inability to divorce is a serious issue for those couples who find
themselves trapped in a marriage they are ready to put behind them, today’s same-sex
couples not only require the right to enter into marriages, but they also need the law to
permit thedissolution of such marriages. If the Supreme Court permits states to retain
their mini-DOMAs, the question will remain whether these laws alone are sufficient to
keep married couples from divorcing. While the Court should consider the possibility that
mini-DOMAs will continue to prevent same-sex couples from divorcing, congressional
measures could also relieve the inherent tension of permitting same-sex divorces in a
mini-DOMA state.
Under the current State-by-State framework, it is often difficult for same-sex
couples to divorce due to (1) domicile requirements to access state courts for the purpose
of divorce, and (2) state statutory or constitutional provisions in the form of miniDOMAs which prevent courts from recognizing (and therefore abolishing) same-sex
marriages. Relying on mini-DOMAs, state courts can quickly reject claims for same-sex
divorces for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For example, in J.B. & H.B.,the Texas
Court of Appeals ruled that a lower court did not have the authority to entertain a petition
for same-sex divorce because the state constitution and statutes defined marriage as
between a man and a woman.191 Because the state was constitutionally and statutorily
184
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prohibited from recognizing same-sex marriages entered out-of-state, the court claimed
that it did not have the authority to recognize the marriage for purposes of
divorce.192Although the couple had been separated for two years,193 they were left
without a means of ending their marriage. This particular court went so far as to say, “[a]
Texas court has no more power to issue a divorce decree for a same-sex marriage than it
does to administer the estate of a living person.”194Similarly, prior to its legislated
recognition of same-sex marriage,195 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Chambers v.
Ormistad found that a Rhode Island family court could not properly recognize a same-sex
marriage for the purpose of entertaining a divorce.196 The Chambers court’s analysis was
quite simple: [a]lthough family courts may “hear and determine all petitions for divorce
from the bond of marriage,” the court found “absolutely no reason to believe that. . .the
legislators understood the word marriage to refer to any state other than ‘the state of
being united to a person of the opposite sex.’”197
Despite these cases, there remains some question as to whether mini-DOMAs are
sufficient to keep married couples from divorcing. Mary Patricia Byrn and Morgan
Holcomb argue that mini-DOMAs do not prevent state courts from granting relief to
same-sex couples seeking divorce.198Byrn and Holocomb contend that judicial findings
of a lack ofsubject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce are justified by misguided
readings of mini-DOMAs and state court jurisdiction.199Specifically, Byrn and Holocomb
argue that because state courts have broad jurisdiction to hear any justiciable dispute,
absent express legislative intent to prohibit state courts from hearing same-sex divorces,
state courts should hear the cases rather than engage in judicial activism to strip
jurisdiction.200Accordingly, ByrnandHolocomb would likely applaud the Wyoming
Supreme Court’s Christiansen decision for finding subject-matter jurisdiction over samesex divorce despite Wyoming’s mini-DOMA.201
In Christiansen, Paula Christiansen and Victoria Lee Christiansen, residents of
Wyoming, were married in Canada in 2008.202 In February 2010, the couple filed for
divorce in Wyoming, a state that did not recognize same-sex marriage.203The district
court dismissed the divorce petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on the
State’s mini-DOMA.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court, while finding inherent tension between the miniDOMA defining marriage as “a civil contract between a male and a female,”204 and
another Wyoming statute adopted much earlier that provided “[a]ll marriage contracts
which are valid by the laws of the country in which contracted are valid in this state,”205
found no such conflict in regards to same-sex divorce proceedings.206In an attempt to
harmonize the statutes which appeared facially in conflict, the Court recognized same-sex
marriage for the limited purpose of divorce.207 The Court explained that while the miniDOMA prevents same-sex couples from entering into a marriage in Wyoming, it does not
mention same-sex marriages entered elsewhere208; moreover, the other statute expressly
allows for Wyoming to recognize a valid Canadian same-sex marriage.209It is important
to realize that although few States have such a parallel statutory structure expressly
requiring courts to reconcile them, the Wyoming statute mandating recognition of out-ofstate marriages is for the most part a codification of the dominant common law principle
lex loci celebrationisthat requires a State to recognize an out-of-state marriage as long as
the marriage does not offend state public policy.210 Viewed in this light, most states
should be able to use Christiansen as a model.211 It is important for other states to
understand the Court’s declaration recognizing same-sex marriage for the limited
purposes of divorce proceedings does not threaten a state’s general ban on such
marriages:
[R]ecognizing a valid foreign same-sex marriage for the limited purpose
of entertaining a divorce proceeding does not lessen the law or policy in
Wyoming against allowing the creation of same-sex marriages. A divorce
proceeding does not involve recognition of a marriage as an ongoing
relationship. Indeed, accepting that a valid marriage exists plays no role
except as a condition precedent to granting a divorce. . . . Respecting the
law of Canada, as allowed by § 20-1-111, for the limited purpose of
accepting the existence of a condition precedent to granting a divorce, is
not tantamount to state recognition of an ongoing same-sex marriage.212
New York, prior to its legalization of same-sex marriage in June 2011, may also be used
as a model for how states that do not generally recognize same-sex marriage can do so for
the limited purpose of granting a divorce. Even though New York did not yet recognize
same-sex marriage, its courts were willing to recognize same-sex marriage for the limited
purpose of granting same-sex divorces. For example, in C.M v. C.C.,the State Supreme
204
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Court held the New York court had jurisdiction to grant a divorce to a same-sex couple
married in Massachusetts.213 Like the Wyoming Supreme Court, this court distinguished
the recognition of marriages from the performance of marriages, reasoning that “the
recognition of a same sex marriage solemnized abroad was not contrary to the public
policy of this state even if the marriage could not be solemnized in New York.”214
However, this court took a more expansive approach than the Wyoming court by
declaring that recognition of same-sex marriages performed out-of-state, not just for
purposes of divorce, isa general question of comity. Unlike the Wyoming Court, Judge
Rosalyn H. Richter wrote, “it is well-settled that in deciding whether to recognize a
marriage that occurred in a sister state, the critical question is whether the marriage
would be valid where contracted.”215Because the same-sex couple was validly married in
Massachusetts in 2005, Judge Richter concluded that the common law doctrine of comity
required the New York court to grant jurisdiction for divorce.216 It should be noted that
although this decision was enabled in part because the Court drew upon a lower court
decision which already established same-sex marriages performed out-of-state should be
recognized,217 notions of comity could still be used by other states to reach the same
conclusion. Although the general notion of comity is one rationale to justify same-sex
marriage, states that do not permit same-sex marriages would likely follow the rationale
of the Wyoming court as its holding is more limited. Still, this case should be used as an
example of how states that do not permit same-sex marriage may still allow for same-sex
divorce.
Using a similar rationale as the New York State Supreme Court, in Hammond v.
Hammond,a New Jersey court was willing to recognize a Canadian same-sex marriage
for the limited purposes of divorce in spite of the state Attorney General’s arguments to
the contrary.218The opinion sympathized with the couple’s situation in which a dying
woman wished to break legal ties to her spouse with whom she was no longer in a
relationship and against whom she had previously obtained a domestic violence
restraining order so that she could marry her current partner, thereby transferring rights,
including end-of-life decision making from her removed spouse to her current partner.219
Ultimately, the court invoked lex loci celebrationis, by which marriages validly
contracted in other jurisdictions are valid in New Jersey as long as they are not offensive
to New Jersey’s public policy.220Interestingly, the New Jersey court relied on the same
case as the C.M v. C.Ccourt to affirm that comity should be employed.221 Judge Mary
Jacobson reasoned, “I don’t see how granting a divorce here is inconsistent with the
legislature’s intent because the legislature did not address the specific issue.”222 This
court believed “we would have a very different situation” if New Jersey had enacted a
213

867 N.Y.S.2d 884, 889 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
Id. at 886.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 885–87.
217
Martinez v. Cnty of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (2008).
218
Transcript of Oral Decision at 10-11, Hammond v. Hammond, No.FM-11-905-08-B (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. Feb. 6, 2009)
219
Id. at 6–9.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 20–21 (citing Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740).
222
Id. at 19.
214

233

Vol. 8:2]

Ellen Shapiro

mini-DOMA.223However, as evident inChristiansen, the presence of a mini-DOMA does
not necessitate a ban on same-sex divorce.
Wyoming, New York, and New Jersey should be used as models for how to
handle same-sex divorce.Even if the Court makes same-sex marriage a state-by-state
issue, all fifty states should still hear cases regarding same-sex divorce. While in
Texas,Judge Tena Callahan (whose decision was ultimately overruled) permitted samesex divorce by declaring that Texas’ ban on same-sex marriages and civil unions violated
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause224—thereby permitting two men
which had married in Massachusetts to divorce—a complete upheaval on same-sex
marriage bans is not required for a court to hear a same-sex divorce. The couple in
questionhad a simple request for a non-contentious divorce that became a national story
and an attempt to overhaul the state’s mini-DOMA.225 Given that only thirty-five percent
of Texas supports the legalization of same-sex marriage,226 it is hardly surprising that any
attempt to overturn Texas’ mini-DOMA227 would be met with significant resistance.228
As long as states are permitted to ban same-sex marriage, an issue that will likely
be decided this spring in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the difficulties with same-sex divorces
will remain. As demonstrated above, courts in Wyoming, New York, New Jersey, and
Marylandovercame the inherent tension in forbidding the performance of same-sex
marriage while allowing same-sex divorce by separating the issues and by confining the
recognition of same-sex marriage to the specific purpose of ending the marriage. If courts
acknowledge, as the Wyoming Supreme Court did, that recognizing same-sex marriage
for the “limited purpose of accepting the existence of a condition precedent to granting a
divorce, is not tantamount to state recognition of an ongoing same-sex marriage,”229 the
difficulties of same-sex divorce will be reduced.
The recognition of same-sex marriage for the limited purposes of divorce should
be required even in states thatassert specific public policy reasons banning same-sex
marriage or have passed explicit bans on recognizing same-sex marriages. Although it
has been settled that “[t]he State. . .has [the] absolute right to prescribe the conditions
upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the
causes for which it may be dissolved,”230 it remains unclear whether states may prescribe
limitations on divorce other than jurisdictional requirements. To require states to
recognize same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of divorce would resolve a serious
due process problem faced by same-sex couples unable to seek a divorce without
interfering with the state’s policies against such marriages. Recognizing a marriage for
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purposes of its termination is surely distinct from performing the marriage. Moreover,
considering that it is possiblestates will be forced to recognize same-sex marriage for
purposes of determining federal benefits, it would seem incongruent not to recognize
same-sex marriage for purposes of divorce. While marriages are meant to last forever,
they often fail, and the couples wish to part ways. Married same-sex couples deserve this
opportunity just as much as married heterosexual couples. By demanding states recognize
same-sex marriage for the limited purposes of divorce, many couples will be saved from
unwanted wedlock.
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